I. INTRODUCTION
In late April of 2004, 60 Minutes II sparked national outrage when it aired a story revealing photographs of American soldiers subjecting detainees at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison to appallingly abusive treatment. 1 This scandal served as at least partial catalyst for Senator John McCain, himself a victim of torture while a prisoner of war in North Vietnam, to propose legislation categorically forbidding future conduct of this sort. 2 In December of 2005, President George W. Bush signed into law the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, otherwise known as the McCain Amendment, which prohibits the "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" of anyone in U.S. custody, regardless of geographic location. 3 The Act passed the Senate by a vote of 90-9, and was seen by human rights activists as a "victory for the rule of law" and a step toward healing the nation's damaged reputation in the eyes of the world. 
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pointing out its shortcomings. 9 These statements amount to little more than White House press releases. Other signing statements are more political in nature; they may be intended as a sort of enforcement directive to an Executive Branch agency or as an attempt to influence later judicial interpretation of the statute's meaning. 10 More controversially, Presidents have issued signing statements in order to express perceived constitutional defects in a bill, ranging from separation of powers concerns to individual rights concerns.
11 These statements may call on Congress to enact corrective legislation, or they may assert the authority to decline to execute the challenged provision or to execute it in a manner which comports with the Executive's interpretation of the Constitution. 12 Although signing statements may be rhetorical, political, or constitutional in nature, this Comment will focus solely on the constitutional variety.
A. Brief History
Article I, section 7 of the U.S. Constitution provides that when a President vetoes a bill, "he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated." 13 There is no constitutional analogue requiring the President to offer any explanation whatsoever when he chooses instead to sign a bill into law.
14 Yet, Presidents of both parties have made extensive use of rhetorical, political, and constitutional signing statements. 15 President James Monroe issued what are considered by scholars to be the first two signing statements in 1819 and 1822, respectively. 16 Neither was issued contemporaneously with the signing of a bill, but both expressed Monroe's intention to interpret an existing law to avoid unconstitutional interference with his Executive prerogatives. 17 In 1830, President Andrew Jackson became responsible for the first two signing statements issued contemporaneously with the KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 signing of the bills to which they were directed. 18 Congress has always resented this practice-a fact illustrated well by an 1842 episode in which President John Tyler issued a "rather timid signing statement" expressing mild doubt about the validity of a portion of a bill dealing with the apportionment of congressional districts. 19 A House Select Committee issued a sharp and lengthy protest authored by Tyler's predecessor John Quincy Adams, denouncing the document as "a defacement of the public records and archives" and an "evil example for the future." 20 Despite its deep roots in the nation's history, the issuance of signing statements remained more or less anomalous well into the twentieth century. 21 By 1950, however, the practice was commonplace. 22 The average number of signing statements issued per year climbed steadily from almost sixteen during the Truman years to more than forty during Clinton's tenure. 23 Additionally, " [c] oncurrent with the rise in the number of statements issued, the usage of signing statements to voice constitutional objections to acts of Congress has become increasingly prevalent over the past 60 years." 24 The Reagan Administration was the first to direct an orchestrated effort toward developing the signing statement as a strategic weapon to aggressively protect Executive prerogatives. 25 One key aspect of this effort was an attempt to establish the signing statement as part of the legislative history of a law, and, in turn, to persuade courts to consider them when interpreting the meaning or constitutionality of statutes. 26 In 1986, Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito, then serving as Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, drafted a memorandum in which he stated that a primary objective of the Litigation Strategy Working Group "is to ensure that Presidential signing statements assume their rightful place in the interpretation of legislation." 27 Alito argued that because the President's approval of a 
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bill is just as important in the enactment process as that of the House or Senate, "it seems to follow that the President's understanding of the bill should be just as important as that of Congress." 28 In December of 1985, Attorney General Edwin Meese III wrote to the West Publishing Company, requesting that the text of presidential signing statements be included in United States Code Congressional and Administrative News ("USCCAN") as part of the legislative history of the Acts of Congress. 29 West's president agreed, adding that he was "surprised nobody thought of it before." 30 During the Clinton Administration, the Office of Legal Counsel again produced memoranda supporting the issuance of signing statements, but this time asserted a presidential authority to use them as a device to announce an intention to refuse to enforce unconstitutional statutes. 31 Interestingly, the first of these memoranda characterized the use of signing statements to create legislative history as "much more controversial" than their use to declare a statute unconstitutional and therefore unenforceable. 32 A subsequent memorandum asserted that the President has an "enhanced responsibility to resist unconstitutional provisions that encroach upon the constitutional power of the Presidency," yet nonetheless acknowledged that the "Supreme Court plays a special role in resolving disputes about the constitutionality of enactments."
33
With this strategic groundwork in place, the stage was set for George W. Bush to make full use of signing statements to defend or expand Executive power by challenging provisions of statutes with perceived constitutional defects. Since taking office, Bush has issued more than 150 signing statements-about twenty-two per year-a rate actually Strategy Working Group (Feb. 5, 1986) 
B. Controversy
Despite all of this activity, the signing statement went largely unnoticed by Congress and the general public until it was thrust into the national spotlight in April of 2006 when a front-page Boston Globe article asserted that President Bush had "quietly claimed the authority to disobey more than 750 laws enacted since he took office." 39 This story sparked a national controversy, fueled by an already-widespread belief that "the Bush administration had taken extreme positions on executive authority in its legal defense of its war-on-terror policies." 40 The article also highlighted Alito's signing statement memorandum, 41 which had surfaced during his Senate confirmation hearings earlier that year, thus implicating the Supreme Court in the turmoil. 42 Adding to the suspicion of a disturbance in the constitutional separation of powers was the fact 34 that President Bush, at that time, had yet to exercise his veto powerbecoming the first President in modern history to serve an entire term without doing so. 43 Had the President abandoned the veto in favor of a more powerful tool in the signing statement?
In June of 2006, the American Bar Association appointed a task force to provide a "scholarly analysis of the utility of presidential signing statements and how they comport with the Constitution and enacted law." 44 The task force concluded that the issuance of signing statements claiming the President's authority to "state the intention to disregard or decline to enforce all or part of a law he has signed, or to interpret such law in a manner inconsistent with the clear intent of Congress" was "contrary to the rule of law and our constitutional system of separation of powers." 45 The report urged Congress to enact legislation to curb the President's issuance of signing statements and to enable members of Congress to seek judicial review in any instance in which the President expressed the intention to interpret a statutory provision in a manner inconsistent with congressional intent.
46
On June 27, 2006, Senator Patrick Leahy remarked before the Senate Judiciary Committee that signing statements posed "a grave threat to our constitutional system of checks and balances" and that President Bush had "used his signing statements as a de facto line-item veto to cherrypick which laws he will enforce in a manner not contemplated by our Constitution." 47 Hearkening back to John Quincy Adams's hyperbolic assessment, Leahy further declared the signing statement a "diabolical device" which "intrude[s] upon the legislative function and also upon the constitutional role of our courts." 48 Several pieces of legislation have been proposed consistent with the ABA Task Force's recommendation, each attempting to regulate the practice in its own way, but none has yet been enacted. 50 The Act purported to confer upon the President the authority to "cancel in whole" certain spending line items of large appropriations bills. 51 Although both Congress and the President desired this arrangement, the Court held that these line-item cancellations were tantamount to impermissibly conferring upon the Executive the congressional authority to amend or repeal statutes. presidential directive not to enforce it, and it can and will be enforced by future Presidents who disagree" with any signing statement issued by a predecessor.
58
Of course, it must be acknowledged that although signing statements lack any legally binding effect, they very well may carry implicit binding effect on Executive officials who, serving at the pleasure of the President, are likely to be especially attentive to White House statements relevant to their duties. This idea is developed more fully later.
It is frequently reported that President Bush's signing statements declare an intention to ignore or set aside a provision of law. 59 However, after an exhaustive study, the Congressional Research Service found that "in almost all instances where President Bush has raised a constitutional concern or objection, he has stated that he will construe the provision at issue in a manner that will avoid his concerns." The canon of constitutional avoidance 63 is a rule of judicial construction that holds that where "a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, [a court's] duty is to adopt the latter." 64 The avoidance canon "has been 'repeatedly affirmed' to the point that it has achieved rare status as a 'cardinal principle' that is 'beyond debate.'" 65 Virtually no Supreme Court Justice has ever voiced doubts about its legitimacy. 66 The avoidance canon is rooted primarily in prudential judicial restraint influenced by the principles of separation of powers and respect for the other branches of government. 67 "The Court has said that because Congress 'is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution,' the Court is obliged to indulge any possible construction that avoids constitutional difficulties." 68 Such deference is deemed necessary by the Court in order to ameliorate worries about the counter-majoritarian institution of judicial review which must occasionally reject the product of the democratic lawmaking process. 69 In other words, the avoidance canon is designed to be an express acknowledgement of legislative supremacy within the lawmaking sphere. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH SHALL CONSTRUE 721 than distort, the policy choices that elected representatives have made." 71 Nevertheless, the avoidance canon "does not give a court the prerogative to ignore the legislative will;" 72 the Supreme Court has stated that "[w]e cannot press statutory construction 'to the point of disingenuous evasion' even to avoid a constitutional question." 73 To put it plainly, if the statute at issue is not susceptible to a saving construction, only then will the Court rule on the constitutional issue. Just how serious the constitutional problem must be before the avoidance canon is triggered, and just how plausible the saving construction must be after the canon has been employed, are questions which seem to be resolved pragmatically with each case.
Although the Court often cites deference to Congress as justification for the avoidance canon, it is also mindful of the finality of its decisions. "If the Court renders a final, binding conclusion as to constitutional interpretation each time it speaks on a constitutional issue, the arduous task of amending the Constitution may provide the only counter to the Court's ruling." 74 Critics of the avoidance canon have asserted that it does not always serve the underlying value of legislative supremacy. 75 "First, given the complexities of the legislative process, it might well be that Congress would want a statute to be construed in a manner that makes the constitutional question unavoidable." 76 Thus, in this context, it is no act of deference to construe a statute in a manner contrary to the expressed legislative intent. Second, in a related argument, critics complain that whenever the Court purports not to decide a constitutional question, it is in fact relying upon previously decided constitutional questions. 77 In this way, the Legislature has a very difficult time challenging the Court to consider budging from static constitutional moorings.
Whatever its shortcomings, the fact remains that the avoidance canon is a deeply entrenched judicial value in our system of checks and balances. This Comment will argue that the framework of the avoidance KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
canon may be successfully transplanted to the Executive Branch in the vehicle of presidential signing statements where it may be used to inform enforcement decisions regarding constitutionally troublesome provisions of law. Because the Executive's constitutional interpretations do not share the binding finality of the judiciary's decisions, and because sufficient safeguards exist to prevent the canon's abuse, the President may employ a more liberal application of the avoidance canon than may the courts-that is, the President may more freely express constitutional doubt regarding statutes and may offer more creative saving interpretations which bear a more attenuated resemblance to the congressional intent. This Comment will explore the institutional checks which prevent a President from misusing this device, as well as the institutional incentives in place for the President to use it with discipline and restraint. Executive application of the avoidance canon in presidential signing statements allows the fullest constitutional implementation of the Acts of Congress while simultaneously affording the Executive the fullest control over its legitimate enforcement prerogatives.
IV. THE BASIS FOR EXECUTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
The avoidance canon was developed by the judiciary as a prudential restraint on its exclusive province "to say what the law is." 78 Nevertheless, "Presidents often avoid constitutional problems, as they should, through their interpretation of ambiguous statutes or through the exercise of enforcement discretion." 79 The question remains whether it is a desirable or legal practice for the President to interpret statutes to avoid constitutional difficulties when the statute unambiguously mandates the Executive to do or refrain from doing something. There exists abundant academic debate regarding whether a President possesses the constitutional authority to decline to enforce, or enforce according to his own saving interpretation, a constitutionally defective statute that admits of no ambiguity or prosecutorial discretion. 80 Professor Dawn Johnsen, constitutional scholar and former acting assistant attorney general for the Office of Legal Counsel, believes that "most of the academic literature fairly and usefully can be described as following one of two approaches: mandatory enforcement or routine non-enforcement of constitutionally The following discussion will borrow her framework.
A. Mandatory Enforcement Regardless of Constitutionality
"One approach to presidential non-enforcement interprets the Constitution as requiring the President to execute acts of Congress, unless directed otherwise by a court of law, even when the President believes a law violates the Constitution." This position is grounded on a literal reading of the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, which provides that the President must "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 85 The Presentment Clause is similarly straightforward, providing that all bills, before becoming law, must be presented to the President, and "[i]f he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated." 86 This clause goes on to qualify the President's veto by providing that it can be overridden by a two-thirds majority of both houses. 87 Neither of these constitutional provisions seems to contemplate the possibility of a President signing a bill and then refusing to enforce it or enforcing it according to an interpretation saving it from perceived constitutional doubt.
Proponents While compelling, neither of the above statements was essential to the holding, and are best viewed as dicta. The only federal appellate court to squarely consider the legitimacy of presidential non-enforcement based on a perceived constitutional defect was the Ninth Circuit in Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman. 90 There, the court found that President Reagan's asserted authority to decline to enforce provisions of the Competition in Contracting Act on constitutional grounds was tantamount to a "de facto line item veto."
91 "The court further found that by refusing to enforce the provision at issue, the President unconstitutionally assumed the power of judicial review, a role constitutionally assigned to the judicial branch." 92 Despite this rather clear rationale, Presidents of both parties have consistently taken the position that where a statute is unconstitutional, it is the President's prerogative-perhaps even his duty-to refuse to enforce it.
93

B. Routine Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Troublesome Law
At the other end of the spectrum is the position that Presidents should routinely refuse to enforce any statute with constitutional defects. This approach acknowledges that the Take Care Clause requires the President to ensure the faithful execution of the laws, but emphasizes that the Constitution is among the "laws" that the President is bound to 88 Proponents of this view find support in the Supremacy Clause, which provides that the Constitution "shall be the supreme Law of the Land," 95 thereby trumping any law in conflict with it. When read together with the President's constitutionally prescribed oath to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution," 96 proponents conclude that the proper Executive resolution of a conflict between a statute and the Constitution is that "'[t]he President must heed and execute the Constitution, the supreme law of our Nation.' Indeed, 'an unconstitutional statute . . . is simply not a law at all,' and therefore 'cannot be one of the "Laws" that the President must faithfully execute. ' The Chadha court invalidated as unconstitutional the congressional practice of enacting legislative veto provisions-provisions requiring single-House or committee approval of Executive agency promulgations-after no fewer than eleven Presidents had gone on record challenging the practice. In a similar statement in Freytag v. Commissioner, four Justices agreed in a concurrence by Justice Scalia that the Constitution provided the President with various means to resist legislative encroachment, including "the power to veto encroaching laws . . . or even to disregard them when they are unconstitutional."
112
Although these statements lend credence to the assertion that a President may decline to enforce a constitutionally objectionable statute, they beg the question: why not instead use the traditionally contemplated power of the veto in order to avoid the problem altogether? One explanation is that a President may sometimes be faced with a statute he believes to be unconstitutional but which he did not have an opportunity to veto because it predates his presidency. Another possibility is that a statute may seem perfectly acceptable on its face, but an unusual scenario causes it to be unconstitutional in only a certain unforeseen application. A third, and significant, factor is the increasingly frequent enactment of omnibus legislation containing numerous unrelated provisions. 113 This type of legislation makes it practically impossible for Presidents to veto provisions they find unconstitutional without sacrificing other unobjectionable and important-even vital-provisions. 114 In this way, the Legislature has indirectly diminished the power of the veto. For example, "Congress has enacted hundreds of legislative vetoes since Chadha, and not even members of Congress expect the President to veto such legislation or to enforce the patently unconstitutional legislative veto provisions." 115 The primary difficulty with this position is that it assumes that the President's ability to interpret the Constitution is infallible, or at least superior to that of Congress's. This conflicts with the generally held assumption that the passage of an act is a de facto congressional determination of its constitutionality. 116 Rather, Presidents confronted with the prospect of enforcing constitutionally objectionable laws should be guided by two principles.
118 "First, the President must enforce the laws in a manner that preserves and respects the integrity of the lawmaking process as set forth in Article I . . . . Second, the President's non-enforcement decisions must promote not the President's own constitutional views in isolation, but the Constitution itself . . . ."
119 Disciplined Executive application of the time-honored avoidance canon, as discussed below, is an attractive middle road which satisfies both principles.
V. APPLICATION OF THE AVOIDANCE CANON IN PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS
Signing statements are a natural device by which a President may express an intention to construe a statute so as to avoid constitutional infirmity. Their non-binding nature provides flexibility to allow the statute to be enforced as written as long as a situation does not arise in which the constitutional defect is implicated. Their public nature promotes dialogue and accountability. The proper application of the avoidance canon in the Executive realm depends largely on the nature of the constitutional concern, particularly whether the statute encroaches into Executive authority. 
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A. Addressing Institutional or Separation of Powers Concerns
Despite well-settled Supreme Court precedent that legislative veto provisions violate the Presentment and Bicameralism Clauses of the Constitution, "to this day a surprising number of statutes enacted by Congress attempt to require the approval of a congressional committee before execution of a law." 120 Legislative veto provisions remain so common that they are one of the most frequent objections raised by President Bush in his signing statements. 121 If the President is presented with one of these provisions alone, he would, and should, almost certainly veto it. This would be the action most in conformity with the lawmaking process as set forth in Article I. However, when a veto is impractical, as in the case of omnibus legislation, refusal to enforce such legislative provisions seems perfectly reasonable.
The Bush Administration typically handles legislative veto provisions in signing statements with language that construes the provision as requiring committee notification rather than approval before execution of a law.
122
In this way, the provision is given the fullest effect possible under the Constitution rather than simply being ignored. The legislative committee members receive at least the information they desire, and the Executive retains its prerogatives.
However, most perceived encroachments into Executive authority have not been as squarely resolved by the Supreme Court as the legislative veto issue. The President has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that he does not acquiesce in the unconstitutional erosion of Executive authority. Presidential acquiescence to statutory provisions which intrude upon traditionally exclusive presidential domain (such as the removal power, the Commander-in-Chief authority, or the responsibility for directing the nation's foreign affairs) may lead to undue difficulty in later restoring those powers. "The presumption of validity which applies to legislation generally is fortified by acquiescence continued through the years." 123 Likewise, "a 'universal and long-established' tradition of prohibiting certain conduct creates a 'strong presumption' that the prohibition is constitutional." "The recognition that the President must uphold the Constitution and that an unconstitutional law is 'no law at all' is, however, insufficient to establish presidential authority to disregard 'unconstitutional' laws, for it begs a critical question: 'unconstitutional' in whose view?" 125 In the absence of a clear Supreme Court pronouncement of the boundary between Legislative and Executive power, it does not appear that the Executive is in any better position to determine the constitutionality of a law than the presumably conscientious Congress which enacted it. This is precisely the reason that careful application of the avoidance canon is desirable.
Presidential compliance with a potentially encroaching law may be a dereliction of duties to the office. Conversely, to entirely ignore the law violates the fundamental respect owed to the Legislature and the Article I process of enacting laws. The President must articulate his constitutional objections in a manner that demonstrates an effort to promote a fair reading of the Constitution, and not simply the President's own constitutional views in isolation.
President Bush has made steps in this direction by stating in his signing statements that he will construe troublesome statutes in such a way as to avoid constitutional difficulties. However:
[T]he large bulk of the signing statements the Bush II Administration has issued to date do not apply particularized constitutional rationales to specific scenarios, nor do they contain explicit, measurable refusals to enforce a law. Instead, the statements make broad and largely hortatory assertions of executive authority that make it effectively impossible to ascertain what factors, if any, might lead to substantive constitutional or interpretive conflict in the implementation of an act.
126
President Bush and subsequent Presidents would benefit by developing language in each signing statement describing with specificity the Executive authority they believe is being threatened. Additionally, the signing statement should precisely and comprehensively describe the authority's grounding in the Constitution or Supreme Court precedent. The signing statement should describe with particularity the manner by which the offending statute violates these principles. Finally, it should set out a plausible saving construction that conforms best to the original congressional intent for the statute. the President should seek out judicial review of potentially unconstitutional legislative encroachment whenever possible by taking the action that will most likely create a justiciable case or controversy.
Still, "[a] relatively small number of statutes will be nonjusticiable whether or not the President enforces them."
131 Most of these situations involve the allocation of constitutional powers between the branches, particularly in the areas of foreign affairs and the Commander-in-Chief power where there is not likely to be an injured U.S. citizen with standing to sue for a violation of statutory or constitutional rights caused by the Executive's enforcement choices.
132 "When barriers to judicial review prevent the courts from providing a check on constitutionally objectionable statutes, and litigation is unavailable as a forum for further dialogue, the President should play an enhanced role in protecting the constitutional structure and the public from the effects of unconstitutional laws." 133 In other words, the risk of harm to the nation from enforcing unconstitutional laws is greater than the risk of harm to the balance of powers from disturbing the congressional prerogative. As mentioned previously, the President is not necessarily a more adept arbiter of constitutionality than Congress. Because the President is susceptible to political pressures, there exists a risk that he might manipulate statutory construction to serve his own interests above the mandates of the Constitution. But Congress is not left without powerful tools with which to check presidential abuses of this type.
Congress has the power to subpoena Executive officials to testify regarding the implementation of laws at oversight hearings. 134 Failure to appear may be rebuked with citations for contempt of Congress.
135
Besides being time-consuming, the hearings are also conducted publicly, forcing the Executive to think carefully about how it wishes to be portrayed to the public regarding its enforcement of the laws. In order to preserve the separation of powers balance, Congress is duty-bound to use its oversight power to check potential Executive abuses of power. 136 Evidence indicates that Congress may have neglected this duty of oversight during the George W. Bush presidency to some extent; at least while the Republicans controlled Congress: "Just one committee in the House of Representatives-the Government Reform Committee-'issued 1,052 subpoenas to probe alleged misconduct' by the Clinton Administration at a cost of over $35 million while the same committee issued just 'three subpoenas to the Bush Administration.'" 137 Thus, if President Bush has indeed misused the signing statement to improperly aggrandize Executive power, a lapse of congressional attention may be at least partially to blame.
A perhaps even more powerful congressional weapon is the carte blanche power of the purse. 138 Congress may refuse, as it wishes, to enact appropriations bills or may withhold funding for a key Executive agency or department. 139 The following anecdote illustrates an occasion when Congress exercised this very power to cause the Reagan 6/17/2008 9:25:38 PM
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Administration to back down from a position it had taken in a signing statement regarding the unconstitutionality of a statute:
In 1984 the Reagan administration signed into law the "Deficit Reduction Act of 1984," and in the signing statement, it objected to executive authority bestowed upon the Comptroller General, an agent of Congress. A provision of the law, known as the "Competition in Contracting Act," gave the Comptroller General the power to withhold appropriated money in government contracting if one party felt that it deserved to win a contract that it had lost. In addition to the signing statement, the Justice Department issued a legal memorandum defending the president's challenge, and sent notification to Congress that it would not defend the provision if it were challenged in the courts. Furthermore, the OMB Director David Stockton sent out notice to all the heads of all the agencies instructing them to not act upon the invalid provision. When the administration informed the Congress that it would not recognize the constitutional validity of the provisioneven after a lower court ruled against it-the Congress responded by threatening to cut-off appropriations to the Department of Justice for FY 1986 and 1987. The administration quickly backed down.
140
A motivated Congress can, in this way, leverage its power to cause the Executive Branch to concede or compromise some of its constitutional objections to laws.
Finally, "Congress may impeach and remove from office all who violate the Constitution, as Congress understands it." 141 This action is best reserved as a last resort, but it is not unprecedented. President Clinton was impeached for perjury and obstruction of justice, and President Andrew Johnson was impeached for violation of the Tenure of Office Act, which as previously discussed was later invalidated as unconstitutional. Neither was convicted and removed from office, but needless to say, impeachment is a palpable deterrent to presidential abuse of power.
It should be noted that it appears, historically, that these and other congressional checks on Executive power have generally served their purpose as it relates to presidential signing statements and Executive assertions of the authority to construe statutes. "Critics . . . are mistaken to equate presidential refusals to enforce constitutionally objectionable laws with a line-item veto or dispensing authority, on the reasoning that Presidents routinely will convert policy objections into constitutional 140. Id. at 14-15 (footnotes omitted). See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text for more detail regarding the lower court's ruling on the legitimacy of the administration's position.
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arguments." 142 On the contrary, "[t]wo centuries of experience establish that the President, too, is capable of principled constitutional interpretation. Presidents . . . have a long tradition of interpreting the Constitution . . . and much of the constitutional analysis is memorialized in written legal opinions of Attorneys General or the Office of Legal Counsel." 143 In addition, an empirical study recently conducted by the Government Accountability Office found that the majority of a representative sample of the provisions of the 2006 appropriations acts to which President Bush attached a signing statement were enforced as written. 144 Of the six that were identified as having not been enforced as written, three were provisions attempting to institute a legislative veto and one was enforced in 38 days rather than the 21 days as directed by the statute. 145 Furthermore, the report stated that although some "agencies did not execute the provisions as enacted, we cannot conclude that agency noncompliance was the result of the President's signing statements."
146
The President has a special duty to the Oval Office and to the Constitution to avoid acquiescing in the erosion of Executive authority. When faced with a statute that impermissibly encroaches on Executive prerogatives, to which a veto is impracticable, the President should employ the avoidance canon in a signing statement, announcing intent to construe the statute in a manner that will give it the fullest possible effect without violating the Constitution. The President should pay special attention to the potential for judicial review, and endeavor to make that happen if at all possible. In the event that judicial review is not likely or possible, Congress possesses a number of tools with which to check the President from manipulating his power to advance his own ambitions rather than an equitable understanding of the constitutional separation of powers.
142. Johnsen, supra note 79, at 41. The dispensing authority is another name for the suspending power discussed at supra note 84. 
B. Addressing Other Constitutional Concerns
The President should follow a similar approach for constitutional concerns other than those grounded in separation of powers issues, such as individual rights or federalism. Again, if the constitutional defect is clearly established by Supreme Court precedent, the President should either veto the bill or issue a detailed signing statement to announce the intent to construe it to avoid the defect, thereby affording the Legislature the fullest constitutional effectuation of its wishes.
The enforcement of constitutionally defective statutes which do not implicate separation of powers concerns is much more likely to produce justiciable cases or controversies.
147
In these situations, there will usually be an individual who is harmed by a deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right stemming from the Executive's enforcement choices. For example, if Congress passes an affirmative action statute, but the President chooses to enforce it so that it avoids perceived Equal Protection Clause violations, a would-be beneficiary of the law may have standing to sue for an injury resulting from the agency or entity failing to strictly comply with the statute as written. Because of the greater likelihood of judicial review, in addition to the congressional checks previously discussed, 148 the risk of presidential abuse of the avoidance canon in these sorts of situations is minimal.
The rationale behind carefully issuing highly specific and detailed signing statements applies with equal force to constitutional challenges involving issues other than the separation of powers. Signing statements such as this exhibit the fundamental respect owed the Congress in the Article I enactment process by requiring the President to demonstrate the legitimate constitutional moorings for his position. At the same time, the President is able to exercise his own constitutional determinations regarding the laws which will affect the lives of Americans.
"Case or controversy requirements and restrictions against courts issuing advisory opinions do not, of course, apply to the executive's internal constitutional decisionmaking, and presidents can better serve individual rights to the extent that they expressly stake out their constitutional commitments in general and in advance of any concrete controversy."
149 Because of the lack of these familiar restrictions placed 147. See Easterbrook, supra note 99, at 927 (discussing the "live controversies" and "real cases" that initiate constitutional review).
148. on the courts, the Executive possesses a particular institutional strength: "the ability to reach out and tackle a problem, rather than wait for it to come knocking." 150 It is thus desirable for the President to proactively wrestle with constitutional questions regarding statutes he signs, and challenge them using a presidential signing statement and the avoidance canon if need be. In this way, the Executive can help prevent a constitutional violation from befalling a citizen without waiting for a definitive ruling from the Supreme Court.
But constitutional violations do inevitably befall citizens, who inevitably bring civil rights actions against government actors. Even here, the Supreme Court's qualified immunity jurisprudence should uniquely counsel Presidents to carefully craft precise signing statements when challenging the constitutionality of statutes which may impact individual rights. The Court has held that "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
151
When evaluating a claim of qualified immunity, a strict two-step rule of procedure applies such that "[a] court . . . 'must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.'" 152 In other words, the court must determine the constitutionality of the statute in question before it can decide whether the government actor enjoys qualified immunity.
Thus, when Executive employment of the avoidance canon results in civil rights litigation, it may have the ironic effect of forcing the court to abandon its own traditional adherence to the avoidance canon in order to confront and decide the constitutionality of the statute in question. The result would be more final judicial resolutions of constitutional questions, leading to more consistency and predictability in the law.
Additionally, a well-articulated signing statement expressing plausible doubt about the constitutionality of the statutory right at issue may very well impact a court's determination of whether the right was clearly established at the time of the violation. position as expressed in the signing statement is ultimately rejected by the court, a strong argument will remain that the official was reasonably endeavoring to execute the law in a manner consistent with the President's interpretation of it, and thus that the right was not clearly established at the time the official acted. The qualified immunity inquiry thus provides at least two incentives-more frequent final adjudication of constitutional questions and more expansive qualified immunity protection for officials-encouraging the President to apply the avoidance canon in a principled, reasonable, and restrained fashion. General assertions of Executive authority and baseless constitutional challenges are not likely to persuade a court that the official reasonably relied upon the President's signing statement in executing the statute at issue in the way that she did.
C. Implications of Application
Remarkable Benefits
The benefits of using presidential signing statements to employ the avoidance canon are many. First, the practice encourages transparency and accountability within the Executive Branch. "The more the public understands what is at stake in executive constitutionalism, the more pressure it can bring to bear on the executive to do it fully and well."
153
In other words, if the Executive Branch is going to continue to selectively enforce statutes based on constitutional concerns-as it has a long history of doing-then the practice should be exposed to as much light as possible. That exposure will require the Executive to express its concerns in a way that is defensible in the balance of powers between the branches as well as in the public eye. The measure of defensibility will be directly proportional to the precision and care with which the timehonored avoidance canon is applied in the vehicle of publicly scrutinized presidential signing statements.
Second, the practice is an appropriate, moderate defense against the erosion of Executive authority. The President should, whenever possible, seek judicial review of statutes which intrude on Executive domain (such as legislative veto provisions or provisions infringing on the President's removal power, Commander-in-Chief authority, etc.) by taking the action most likely to set up a justiciable case or controversy. When judicial review is not possible, the President has a justifiable 153 In any event, regardless of justiciability, the Legislature is equipped with adequate tools to check any abuse or manipulation by the President. 159 Third, careful and thorough application of the avoidance canon may actually lead to increased opportunity for judicial review in individual rights situations due to the Supreme Court's unique qualified immunity jurisprudence. If an Executive official asserts qualified immunity as a defense to a civil rights action, claiming that the law in question was not "clearly established" as evidenced by the plausible doubt expressed in a signing statement, the reviewing court will be forced to address the underlying constitutional concern, to the benefit of all.
Dangers Are Mitigable
Critics articulate a number of concerns regarding presidential signing statements and the Executive practice of enforcing constitutionally objectionable statutes based on a saving construction. Among them is the possibility that courts will favor the Executive interpretation over congressional intent derived from legislative history when deciding the 154 One response to this perceived danger is that empirical evidence shows that signing statements are rarely cited in court opinions. 162 An exhaustive search of all published federal cases from 1945 to May 2007 found that only 137 federal court opinions cited or referred to presidential signing statements. 163 When cited or referred to, they appear to have had little impact on judicial decisionmaking. 164 Of the 137 opinions, only five of those were Supreme Court opinions, and the signing statement was discussed only in the dissenting opinion of two of those five. 165 Thus, empirical evidence strongly shows that courts have not been prone to cite presidential signing statements, let alone rely on them for interpretation of a statute. Furthermore, commentators have noted that the Supreme Court, due to changing membership, has generally been moving away from honoring legislative history for the past two decades. 166 Although the argument is largely moot due to this empirical evidence, there remains a convincing rationale supporting the treatment of presidential signing statements as part of the legislative history of a statute. Justice Frankfurter wrote "[i]f the purpose of construction is the ascertainment of meaning, nothing that is logically relevant should be excluded." 167 The President in fact plays a significant constitutional role in the enactment of legislation, from recommending legislation 168 to signing or vetoing the same.
169
The Executive Branch typically is heavily involved in suggesting legislation and then carefully monitoring it as it makes its way through the legislative process, attempting to inject input all along the way. 170 This state of affairs has led at least one political commentator to suggest that "the legislature is not the dominant influence in the legislative process. The President is more influential." 171 The Second Circuit acknowledged the value of presidential involvement in enacting legislation in United States v. Story, writing that "President Reagan's views are significant here because the Executive Branch participated in the negotiation of the compromise legislation." 172 Admittedly, Executive proposal and monitoring of legislation occurs at a much earlier stage of the legislative process than enactment. But, because a bill cannot become law without the President's signature (absent an overridden veto), it stands to reason that his understanding of the law at signing is significant. His involvement in the process means that he may be as familiar with the bill as anyone in Congress. And his understanding of the statute is also likely to be informed by real-world enforcement expertise. Both of these factors make the President's views of a bill at signing at least relevant to a Court's interpretation of constitutionality.
The potential for manipulation is checked by Congress's previously mentioned tools, such as oversight, appropriations, and impeachment. 173 A second perceived danger regarding the practice of signing statements and Executive construction of statutes is that the President will abandon the veto in favor of this new device, disrupting the separation of powers and the venerated system of checks and balances. 174 Again, this concern can be quieted with empirical evidence. First, the GAO study that concluded that most of the 2006 appropriations provisions are being enforced as written notwithstanding the issuance of signing statements is illustrative of the fact that signing statements do not constitute some kind of mad Executive power grab. 175 Second, as discussed previously, the signing statement has no intrinsically legally binding effect.
176
If the President vehemently disfavored a piece of legislation, believing it to be poor policy, his better option would be the traditional veto which would keep it off the books not only during his presidency, but permanently. Furthermore, in no case should a President issue a signing statement outlining an intention to construe a statute to conform simply to his policy preferences. Such a situation would indeed violate the constitutional system of separation of powers. The signing statement employing the avoidance canon indeed represents a new tool which may be used by Presidents to achieve their objectives. However, the acquisition of new devices such as this one is not unique to the George W. Bush presidency. Presidential scholar Ryan Barilleaux argues that pushing at the ambiguous and vague boundaries of Article II is what Presidents must do in order to keep up with their many urgent and evolving responsibilities. 177 He calls this behavior "Venture Constitutionalism," defined as "an assertion of constitutional legitimacy for presidential actions that do not conform to settled understandings of the President's constitutional authority."
178
For example, Thomas Jefferson purchased the Louisiana Territory when there was no clear understanding of how the country might acquire new territory, Abraham Lincoln asserted unprecedented powers during an unprecedented Civil War, and "Jimmy Carter asserted the unilateral authority to terminate a treaty in force," an action later upheld in Goldwater v. Carter.
179
The actions tend to fall into one of three categories: actions designed to protect the president's institutional interests such as Andrew Jackson's refusal to acknowledge the validity of the Tenure in Office Act; actions designed to promote national security and the advancement of our national interests, such as the actions Lincoln took during the Civil War; and finally actions designed to help the president shape policy.
180
"The only thing that limits a venturing president is the Congress, which has the institutional capacity and resources to take on the most aggressive of presidents. But it has to muster the will to do so."
181 If the avoidance canon is carefully applied within presidential signing statements, there is little opportunity for abuse or manipulation because sufficient congressional checks are in place. Executive employment of the avoidance canon in presidential signing statements is a useful tool for the protection of legitimate Executive prerogatives. Additionally, when carefully applied, it may lead to more opportunity for judicial review of constitutional questions, leading to more consistent and predictable law. Out of appropriate deference to the Legislature, when the veto is wholly impractical, the President should construe statutes to avoid constitutional peril, thereby affording Congress the fullest constitutional enforcement of the law.
Presidents must also keep in mind that application of the avoidance canon to the Acts of Congress may not be the most politically expedient decision. President Bush is still suffering fallout from the signing statement attached to the McCain Amendment prohibiting the cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees. President Bush's use of signing statements has even become an issue in the 2008 presidential campaign rhetoric. Senator John McCain has promised that he "'would never issue a signing statement, '" 182 Senator Hillary Clinton conceded that she might "'in very rare instances'" attach a signing statement to "'provisions that contradict the Constitution,'" 183 and Senator Barack Obama has argued that "'[n]o one doubts that it is appropriate to use signing statements to protect a president's constitutional prerogatives; unfortunately, the Bush administration has gone much further than that.'" 184 These statements clearly support the notion that although the President may have a legitimate constitutional separation of powers concern with any given statute, preserving political goodwill with Congress may often be the more strategically sound move.
With sufficient congressional checks and safeguards in place, Presidents may successfully and accountably borrow the judiciary's avoidance canon to construe the Acts of Congress in a manner that comports with the Executive interpretation of the Constitution. Congress is equipped with powerful tools, such as oversight, appropriations, and impeachment, with which to encourage the Executive to remain faithful to congressional intent when judicial review of Executive enforcement or non-enforcement is not possible. And when Executive interpretation and enforcement choices impact American citizens and lead to civil rights 
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litigation, the peculiarities of qualified immunity jurisprudence will require final judicial resolution of the constitutional disagreement between Congress and the President. In this way, Executive application of the avoidance canon in presidential signing statements is a reasonable and observable method by which Presidents may best fulfill their obligations to execute the law and uphold the Constitution, while simultaneously allowing Congress the greatest effectuation of its Acts as constitutionally permissible.
